He also requested air support. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. 2, pp. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. Vaccines. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. Conspiracy The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. Naval Institute. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. Both U.S. ships opened fire on the radar contacts, but reported problems maintaining a lock on the tracking and fire control solution. Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. ThoughtCo. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. 5. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. That very night, the idea was put to the test. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. The Americans claimed they sank two torpedo boats and damaged a third, while the torpedo boats claimed to have shot down two American aircraft. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. The stage was set. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). . He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192, embarked in the Maddox, concluded that there would be "possible hostile action." Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14) crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. (2021, February 16). Aircraft from the Ticonderoga (CVA-14) appeared on the scene, strafing three torpedo boats and sinking the one that had been damaged in the battle with the Maddox. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. . Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. Vietnam is a very watery country. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 Hickman, Kennedy. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. He headed seaward hoping to avoid a confrontation until daybreak, then returned to the coast at 1045, this time north of Hon Me. "The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their offshore islands. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. . Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 17. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. 136-137. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. The World is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. When Did the U.S. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. Gulf of Tonkin incident - Wikipedia :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. Changing course in time to evade the torpedoes, the Maddox again was attacked, this time by a boat that fired another torpedo and 14.5-mm machine guns. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian Ten shocking conspiracy theories that were completely This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. IV-2 to IV-4. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN? After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." . This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. A lesser-known fact is that Jim Morrisons father, Captain George Stephen Morrison, commanded the Carrier Division during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. The Taliban silenced him. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." Launching on Aug. 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately 30 North Vietnamese vessels. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. Codenamed Desoto, they were special U.S. Navy patrols designed to eavesdrop on enemy shore-based communicationsspecifically China, North Korea, and now North Vietnam. But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. 8. The North Vietnamese coastal radars also tracked and reported the positions of U.S. aircraft operating east of the ships, probably the combat air patrol the Seventh Fleet had ordered in support. Gulf of Tonkin - A secret report reveals how easily soldiers, spies and politicians can jump to a conclusion and plunge the country into war. On 28 July, the latest specially fitted destroyer, the Maddox (DD-731), set out from Taiwan for the South China Sea. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. no isolated event. Gulf Of Tonkin American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. This explanation held briefly, long enough for President Johnson -- admittedly not inclined to engage in what might be called oververification -- to rush the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. Easily outdistancing the North Vietnamese boat, the commandos arrived back at Da Nang shortly after daybreak.8, North Vietnam immediately and publicly linked the 34A raids and the Desoto patrol, a move that threatened tentative peace feelers from Washington that were only just reaching Hanoi. 1. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. 14. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working Gulf of Tonkin incident | Definition, Date, Summary, Significance Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission..

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